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Abstract
The shuffle model of differential privacy (Erlingsson et al. SODA 2019; Cheu et al.
EUROCRYPT 2019) and its close relative encode-shuffle-analyze (Bittau et al. SOSP
2017) provide a fertile middle ground between the well-known local and central models.
Similarly to the local model, the shuffle model assumes an untrusted data collector
who receives privatized messages from users, but in this case a secure shuffler is used
to transmit messages from users to the collector in a way that hides which messages
came from which user. An interesting feature of the shuffle model is that increasing the
amount of messages sent by each user can lead to protocols with accuracies comparable
to the ones achievable in the central model. In particular, for the problem of privately
computing the sum of n bounded real values held by n different users, Cheu et al.
showed that O(
√
n) messages per user suffice to achieve O(1) error (the optimal rate
in the central model), while Balle et al. (CRYPTO 2019) recently showed that a single
message per user leads to Θ(n1/3) MSE (mean squared error), a rate strictly in-between
what is achievable in the local and central models.
This paper introduces two new protocols for summation in the shuffle model with
improved accuracy and communication trade-offs. Our first contribution is a recur-
sive construction based on the protocol from Balle et al. mentioned above, providing
poly(log log n) error with O(log log n) messages per user. The second contribution is a
protocol with O(1) error and O(1) messages per user based on a novel analysis of the
reduction from secure summation to shuffling introduced by Ishai et al. (FOCS 2006)
(the original reduction required O(log n) messages per user).
∗Now at DeepMind.
†Work done while at the Alan Turing Institute.
1
1 Introduction
In the shuffle model of differential privacy individuals communicate with an analyzer through
a mixer that (potentially) disassociates a message from its sender [2, 6, 4]. Recent work on
the shuffle model provides protocols for some basic statistical tasks, demonstrating that the
shuffle model allows for improved accuracy, compared with local differential privacy [6, 4, 1,
9, 7, 8]. A recurring task in these papers is real summation, where the task is to approximate
the sum of real values x1, . . . , xn ∈ [0, 1] held by n users. The results these papers present
differ in the accuracy achieved, the number of messages sent by each user, and message
length (See Table 1 for details).
1.1 Trade-offs of the Shuffle Model
The first protocol for real summation in the shuffle model, presented by Cheu et al. [4], is
a O(
√
n)-message protocol with MSE (mean squared error) O(1) where each user produces
a unary encoding of their inputs with precision O(
√
n) and submits to the shuffler the
result of applying independent binary randomized response mechanisms to each of the bits
in this representation of the input. The analyzer can just sum the bits submitted by all
users and then apply a debiasing operation. We note that while the protocol by Cheu et
al. was presented in a model where all messages are sent through a single shuffler, their
privacy analysis is based on the composition of several single-message protocols. Therefore
an implementation of the protocol in a parallel shuffle model, where multiple shufflers exists
and each user sends a single message to each, would attain the same privacy guarantees.1
Focusing on the setting where each user sends a single message, Balle et al. [1] provided
matching upper and lower bounds showing real summation in the single-message shuffle
model can be solved with MSE Θ(n1/3). In particular, this result shows that the single
message shuffle model sits strictly in-between the local and central models of differential
privacy. In terms of techniques, the protocol relies on amplification properties of the shuffle
model introduced in [1] (see also [6]). The intuitive idea underlying this approach is to have
clients send, along with their inputs, a set of random messages. The latter get mixed up with
the real inputs by the shuffler, providing a “blanketing noise” that hides the contribution
of any single user. Although this technique was introduced by Balle et al. [1] in the single-
message model where each user either contributes their real data or a message from the
blanket, it has been later applied by Ghazi et al. [7] also in the multi-message setting.
1.2 New Real Summation Protocols
We introduce new protocols for real summation in the shuffle model, improving on the
accuracy and communication of previous protocols. Our first contribution is a recursive
construction that uses the blanketing technique of Balle et al. The construction is based
on the protocol from [1], which achieved optimal mean squared error of Θ(n1/3) for single
1See Section 2.3 for a discussion of the single and parallel shuffle models.
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message protocols. Our protocol can be viewed as realizing a trade-off between accuracy and
the number of messages m sent by each user. The trade-off improves on the error achieved
in the single message setting already for m as small as 2 and 3 (where the MSE reduces to
O(n1/9) and O(n1/27) respectively), and yields poly(log log n) error with m = O(log logn).
Our second contribution is of a very different flavor. We reduce the problem of differen-
tially private real addition with optimal O(1) MSE to the problem of secure addition over a
finite group. The reduction applies finite discretization on the inputs, as well as introduces
noise (akin to that added in the Laplace mechanism [5]) which is added in a distributed
manner.
For secure addition over a finite group, we begin with the protocol by Ishai, Kushilevitz,
Ostrovsky, and Sahai [12] (to which we refer henceforth as the IKOS protocol). In the setting
of the IKOS protocol, n users hold values x1, . . . , xn in a finite group Zq and wish to securely
compute their sum over Zq. To do so, each user i splits their input xi into m additive
secret shares (over Zq), and sends all shares anonymously to the server via a shuffler. The
server hence obtains the shuffled nm shares and reconstructs the result by summing them
up. Ishai et al. showed that splitting each value xi into m = O(log q + σ + log n) shares
suffices to achieve statistical security parameter σ, in the sense that a (computationally
unlimited) server seeing the set of shares submitted by the users cannot distinguish two
inputs (x1, . . . , xn) and (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n) with
∑
i xi =
∑
i x
′
i, except with advantage 2
−σ.
Curiously, with the analysis provided in [12] the number of shares m grows as a function
of n. This is in contrast with the intuition that a larger number of participants help any
single user’s contribution to “hide in the crowd”, allowing m to decrease as n grows. The
reduction from differentially private real-addition to secure addition over finite groups makes
minimizing the number of shares m a question of relevance not only to secure computation
but also to understanding the trade-off between accuracy, number of messages sent by each
party, and length of these messages in the shuffle model of differential privacy.
We provide a novel analysis of the IKOS protocol, showing that larger n does indeed
help to reduce the number of required messages m. We show that for statistical security
parameter σ it suffices to take the number of shares to be m =
⌈
2σ+log2(q)
log2(n)−log2(e) + 2
⌉
. As a
concrete example, computing the sum of 64-bit numbers with security parameter σ = 80 by
n = 103 users, our bounds show that 29 messages per party suffice whereas 15 messages per
user suffice when n = 106. In both cases, one of the messages can be sent outside the shuffle.
A more detailed account of our results is provided in Section 3, after the formal presen-
tation of the shuffle model.
How the two results compare? Our IKOS-based protocol gives optimal O(1) MSE,
which is superior to the poly(log logn) MSE of the recursive protocol. However, there are
some considerations that may make the latter sometime preferable. In particular, the recur-
sive protocol can be instantiated with two and three messages, yielding MSE O(n1/9) and
O(n1/27) respectively. This shows that there is a concrete advantage of going beyond one
message, where the optimal MSE is Θ(n1/3) [1].In contrast, the analysis of the IKOS-based
protocol does not provide any guarantees for such a small number of messages.
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Furthermore, the IKOS-based protocol is not robust to manipulation by dishonest users.
A single user deviating from the protocol execution can bias the result by an arbitrary
amount. 2 In comparison, our recursive protocol, does not put as much trust in the
users, as the effect that any single dishonest user can have on the final sum is bounded
by 1 + Oδ
(
(log logn)2
n2/3ǫ2
)
. It is instructive to compare this result with the recent analysis of
manipulation by Cheu et al. [3], which shows that in the local model of differential privacy,
a dishonest users effect on the outcome is of magnitude O(1/ǫ).
Finally, increasing communication has different effects on each of the protocols. In-
tuitively, for a fixed choice of ǫ, increasing the number of messages per user in the first
protocol results in better accuracy, while in the second protocol it results in a smaller value
for δ.
1.3 Concurrent Independent Work
We mention two works done concurrently and independently of our work which are relevant
to this paper. First, independently of our work, Ghazi, Manurangsi, Pagh, and Velingker [9]
proposed protocols achieving MSE O(1) with O(logn) messages, using an approach similar
to that of the IKOS protocol. Their approach differs from ours in the employed distributed
noise aggregation scheme: while Ghazi et al. rely on a similar technique to the one used by
Shi et al. [14], we exploit the infinite divisibility properties of the geometric distribution, as
suggested by Goryczka and Xiong [10]. Quantitatively, our noise addition technique makes
the error independent of δ, saving a factor ofO(log(1/δ)) in the MSE, and our communication
complexity is independent of ǫ saving a factor of O(log(1/ǫ)) over [9].
In a follow up work, Ghazi, Manurangsi, Pagh, and Velingker have, concurrently and in-
dependently of our work, obtained an analysis of the IKOS protocol that provides guarantees
for a constant number of messages [8]. Interestingly, their result gives the same communica-
tion cost as our analysis (up to constant factors), but the proof techniques are different. In
particular, while at its core our result involves an analysis of the distribution of connected
components in a certain family of random graphs, their analysis is based on properties of
the rank of a certain family of random matrices. A key difference between both approaches
is that ours allows the secure summation protocol to operate over a finite group Zq with
no constraints on q, while in principle theirs only works over finite fields because otherwise
the relevant concepts from linear algebra (e.g. rank) are not defined. Moreover, our analysis
tracks constants, and thus yields concrete privacy parameters.
2 The Shuffle Model of Differential Privacy
This section formally defines the shuffle model used throughout the paper. This model
provides privacy-preserving protocols for computing aggregate statistics using data held by
users. The data is privatized and sent to a data collector for analysis through a trusted
2We leave open the question whether this can be remedied with a low penalty in efficiency.
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communication channel that randomly shuffles the messages of many users together. We start
by recalling the definition of differential privacy, proceed to introduce the shuffle functionality
together with the rest of the ingredients necessary to specify a protocol in this model, define
the semantics of the shuffled model used in this paper, and conclude by discussing related
models.
2.1 Central and Local Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) is a formal model providing strong individual privacy guarantees
for data analysis tasks [5]. A randomized mechanism M : Xn → O satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP if for
any pair of inputs ~x and ~x′ differing in a single coordinate (we denote this relation by ~x ≃ ~x′)
and any (measurable) event E ⊆ O on the output space we have
P[M(~x) ∈ E]− eǫ · P[M(~x′) ∈ E] ≤ δ .
In words: changing the data of one individual (among the n contributing their data for anal-
ysis) does not significantly affect the probability distribution over outputs of the mechanism.
In this standard definition of differential privacy the mechanism has direct access to the
data about n individuals. Such data might be stored in a database curated by the party
executing the mechanism, whose output is then released to the world. This is generally
referred to as the central (or curator) model, and an implicit trust assumption is made that
the curator will keep the database secret and only the outputs of DP mechanisms executed
on the data will be released.
The local model of differential privacy [13] considers a subclass of all DP mechanisms
which operate under the assumption that each user applies randomness to privatize their
own data before sending it to (a potentially untrusted) aggregator for analysis. In a non-
interactive setting where the aggregator receives the data from all users at the same time,
mechanisms are specified in terms of a local randomizer3 R : X → Y and an analyzer
A : Yn → O, and output the result MR,A(~x) = A(R(x1), . . . ,R(xn)). In this case the
privacy guarantees of the mechanism are measured with respect to the view of the aggregator:
MR,A is (ǫ, δ)-DP if for any ~x ≃ ~x′ and any event E ⊆ Yn we have
P[ ~R(~x) ∈ E]− eǫ · P[ ~R(~x) ∈ E] ≤ δ ,
where ~R(~x) = (R(x1), . . . ,R(xn)).
2.2 Shufflers and Multi-sets
A shuffler S : Yn → Yn is a randomized mechanism that returns the result of applying
a uniform random permutation of [n] to its inputs. The shuffling operation “erases” all
the information about the positions each particular message occupied in the input. From
an information-theoretic perspective this is equivalent to a deterministic mechanism F :
3Each user could use a different randomizer, but here we ignore this setting for simplicity.
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Y
n → NYn that outputs the multi-set of entries in an n-tuple (i.e. forgets about the order in
which the inputs were provided). This can be made formal by observing that the output of
S(~x) can be used to simulate the output of F(~x) and vice versa. Consequently, these two
equivalent points of view on the action performed by the shuffler will be used interchangeably
throughout the paper.
2.3 The Shuffle Model
The shuffle model of differential privacy [6, 4] considers a data collector that receives messages
from n users (possibly multiple messages from each user). The key distinctive feature of the
shuffle model is the assumption that a mechanism is in place to provide anonymity to each of
the messages, i.e., in the data collector’s view, the messages have been shuffled by a random
unknown permutation. The concrete formulation of the shuffle model used in this paper is
as follows (variants of this model are discussed below).
An m-message protocol in the shuffle model is specified by a pair of algorithms P =
(R,A), where R : X → Ym, and A : (Yn)m → O, for a number of users n > 1 and number
of messages m ≥ 1. We call R the local randomizer, X the input space, Y the message space
of the protocol, A the analyzer of P, and O the output space.
The randomized mechanism MP : Xn → O defined by the protocol P is defined as
follows. Each user i holds a data record xi, to which they apply the local randomizer to
obtain a vector of messages ~yi = (y
(1)
i , . . . , y
(m)
i ) = R(xi). The users then use m independent
shufflers S(j) : Yn → Yn, j ∈ [m], to transmit their messages to the data collector; the jth
message of each user is sent via the jth shuffler. The data collector receives the outputs
of the m shufflers ~y(j) = S(j)(y(j)1 , . . . , y(j)n ), j ∈ [m], and processes them using the analyzer
to obtain the output of the protocol MP(~x) = A(~y(1), . . . , ~y(m)) on inputs ~x = (x1, . . . , xn).
This is illustrated in Figure 1.
From a privacy standpoint the data collector might have incentives to look at the outputs
of the shufflers to obtain information about some user’s input. On the other hand, the
shufflers are assumed to be fully trusted black-boxes free from any snooping or interference.
Thus, while the output of the protocol is the result of applying the analyzer to the shuffled
messages, the privacy of such a protocol is formulated directly in terms of the view of the
data collector VP(~x) = (~y(1), . . . , ~y(m)) containing the tuples produced by the m shufflers.
In particular, the protocol will provide privacy to individuals if for any pair of inputs ~x
and ~x′ differing in a single coordinate the views VP(~x) and VP(~x′) of the data collector are
indistinguishable in the standard sense of differential privacy.
Definition 2.1. An m-message protocol P = (R,A) in the shuffle model is (ǫ, δ)-DP if for
any pair of inputs ~x, ~x′ ∈ Xn with ~x ≃ ~x′ and any (measurable) event E ⊆ (Yn)m we have
P[VP(~x) ∈ E]− eǫ · P[VP(~x′) ∈ E] ≤ δ .
Note that the definition of view allows us to write the mechanism as the composition
MP = A ◦ VP , and by the post-processing property of differential privacy the definition
above implies thatMP is an (ǫ, δ)-DP mechanism in the standard sense. This definition also
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Shuffler S(j)Shuffler S(1) Shuffler S(m)
~yi ←R(xi)
User i
~y1 ←R(x1)
User 1
~yn ← R(xn)
User n
. . .. . .
y
(1)
i
y
(j)
i
y
(m)
i
S(j)(y(j)1 , . . . , y(j)n )
Figure 1: In the shuffle model, each local randomizer sends one message to each of m
independent shufflers.
provides a clear parallelism between the shuffle model and the (non-interactive) local model
of differential privacy: in the latter the view of the data collector is the tuple of messages
produced by each user (~y1, . . . , ~yn) and it is this view that is required to be differentially pri-
vate. In the shuffle model the view of the data collector is obtained from the view in the local
model after the additional randomization step introduced by the shufflers. Quantifying the
additional privacy provided by the shuffling step is one of the central questions in the shuffle
model, which has given rise to a number of privacy amplification statements (both in implicit
and explicit form) [6, 4, 1]. Broadly speaking, these results show that, in the one message
(m = 1) case, if the protocol (x1, . . . , xn) 7→ (R(x1), . . . ,R(xn)) satisfies ǫ0-DP, then after
shuffling the resulting protocol satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP with ǫ = O(min{1, ǫ0}eǫ0
√
log(1/δ)/n).
In particular, this implies that ǫ0 = O(1) yield shuffled protocols with ǫ = Oδ(1/
√
n) and
ǫ0 ≤ log(
√
n) yields ǫ = Oδ(1).
2.4 Observations About the Model
A number of variations on the concrete model described above could be considered. Each of
these raises one or more subtleties which we now discuss to further motivate the model used
throughout the paper.
Single shuffler protocols. Instead of m parallel shufflers one can consider m-message
protocols where the mn messages contributed by all the users are shuffled together using a
single shuffler. From a privacy standpoint the single shuffler setting can provide additional
privacy because, unlike in the case of parallel shufflers, the data collector cannot in general
identify a group of n messages containing at least one message from a given user i. This
additional privacy gain, however, can only be realized when the m messages generated by
a user’s local randomizer play “exchangeable” roles in the computation performed by the
analyzer (e.g. when the messages are summed). This is the case, for example, for the multi-
message protocol by Cheu et al. [4] for summation of inputs xi ∈ [0, 1] using a single shuffler.
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On the other hand, for the protocol we present in Section 4 it is crucial to apply a different
debiasing operations to the messages coming from each of the shufflers. We also note that
our setting with m parallel shufflers can be trivially simulated using a single shuffler where
the m messages contributed by each user come with a label j ∈ [m] that enables the data
collector to recover the message grouping after shuffling. But even in cases where this
simulation is a viable solution, there still exists a relevant distinction in terms of the assumed
threat model which might make the parallel shuffler implementation more preferable: in the
single shuffler setting an attacker only needs to compromise one shuffler to collect all the
messages submitted by a given user, while in the parallel shuffler setting an attacker needs
to compromise m independent shufflers to obtain this same level of access.
User-dependent randomizers. The model used in this paper assumes every user applies
the same local randomizer to their data. This could be relaxed by letting each user employ
a different randomizer. However, when used in its full generality this relaxation can lead
to protocols where no privacy gains are obtained from the shuffling step. For example, in a
protocol where the output domain of the randomizer of each user is disjoint from the output
domains of the rest of randomizers. Note that each individual local randomizer can still
provide local differential privacy in this case, but after shuffling it is possible to re-identify
which messages were submitted by which user, so there is no privacy amplification coming
from shuffling.
Interactive shuffle model. The work of Erlingsson et al. [6] considers a more general
shuffle model where each user’s data can be processed by a different randomizer in a poten-
tially adaptive fashion. This is achieved by significantly strengthening the trust assumptions
on the shuffler, which now becomes an interactive intermediary between the analyzer and
the users. In particular, in the interactive shuffle model users submit their data in plain
text to the shuffler, who applies a random permutation to it, and then provides answers to
a sequence of queries from the analyzer in the form of local randomizers which are applied
to the next permuted data record. The sequence of randomizers provided by the analyzer
can depend adaptively on previous answers. In this model, an attacker compromising the
shuffler can, in principle, gain access to the plain-text data from the users – while in the
non-interactive model the users at least get some level of local differential privacy – although
some cryptographic constructions can be used to mitigate such risks [2]. On the other hand,
interactivity enables more complex computations which cannot be implemented in a single
round non-interactive protocol (e.g. mini-batch stochastic gradient descent).
3 Private Summation in the Shuffle Model
In this paper we are concerned with the problem of real summation where each user i holds a
real number xi ∈ [0, 1] and the goal of the protocol is for the analyser to obtain a differentially
private estimate of
∑n
i=1 xi. For each such protocol P we are interested in quantifying the
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Reference MSE Num. messages
Cheu et al. [4] O(log2(n/δ)/ǫ2) O(ǫ
√
n)
Balle et al. [1] O(n1/3/ǫ4/3) 1
Ghazi et al. [9]† O(log(1/δ)/ǫ2) O(log(n/ǫδ))
Ghazi et al. [8]† O(1/ǫ2) O(1 + log(1/δ)/ log(n))
Section 4 O((log logn)2 log(1/δ)/ǫ2) O(log log n)
Section 5 O(1/ǫ2) O(log(n/δ))
Section 6 O(1/ǫ2) O(1 + log(1/δ)/ log(n))
(† Concurrent and independent work)
Table 1: Comparison of protocols for real summation in the shuffle protocol.
final accuracy in terms of the worst-case mean squared error (MSE) defined as
MSE(P) = sup
~x∈[0,1]n
E

(MP(~x)− n∑
i=1
xi
)2 , (1)
where the expectation is over the randomness in the protocol. In some cases (e.g. Section 4)
we will use as building blocks summation protocols over different domains X ⊂ R or X ⊂ Z.
For such protocols the definition of MSE is modified by replacing the supremum over ~x ∈
[0, 1]n to a supremum over ~x ∈ Xn.
Recall that in the curator model of differential privacy the Laplace mechanism provides
an ε-DP mechanism for the problem of real summation with MSE Oε(1) and this is optimal.
On the other hand, the optimal MSE under ε-DP in the local model is Oε(n). Real summa-
tion in the shuffle model raises interesting trade-offs between accuracy and communication,
where the latter can be quantified both in terms of number of messages per user and size of
these messages (in number of bits). Known results for this problem together with the new
contributions in this work are summarized in Table 1. We now give a technical overview of
our contributions.
3.1 Our Results
Our main contributions are two new protocols for real summation in the shuffle model
with improved accuracy and communication over prior work. The two protocols are very
different in nature. One is based on a recursive application of the optimal one message
protocol from [1] with a carefully designed finite-precision numeric representation scheme.
The second protocol uses a novel analysis of a reduction from secure summation to multi-
message shuffling based on random additive shares given in [12] to simulate an optimal
protocol in the central model using distributed noise.
Recursive protocol. The recursive protocol (Section 4) provides a trade-off between ac-
curacy and number of messages: given m messages and fixed privacy parameters ǫ and δ,
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the protocol with n users achieves MSE O(n3
−m
(1+m3)). In particular, this yields protocols
with MSE O(n1/9), O(n1/27) and O(log log3 n) for m = 2, 3, ⌈log logn⌉ messages respectively.
To give an overview of the recursive protocol we first recall that an optimal protocol for
the one-message case (cf. [1]) can be constructed by fixing a precision p ∈ N, p = O(n1/3),
and letting each user i apply to their input xi ∈ [0, 1] a randomized response mechanism
that with some probability γ = O(n−2/3) returns a uniform value in {0, . . . , p} and with
probability 1 − γ returns ⌊pxi⌋ + Ber(pxi − ⌊pxi⌋), the unbiased randomized rounding of
xi to precision p. The values of p and γ are obtained by optimizing the trade-off between
the error introduced by the rounding step and the error induced by the privacy-preserving
randomized response step.
Our first protocol extends this approach to the setting where each user sends m messages.
The key idea is to capitalize on the privacy provided by shuffling the result of a randomized
response mechanism by devising an encoding scheme for x ∈ [0, 1] into m fixed-precision
numbers and apply a randomized response mechanism to each of these numbers indepen-
dently. The encoding proceeds as follows: we take a sequence of precisions p1, . . . , pm ∈ N
with p1 = O(n
3−m) and pj+1 = ⌈p1/3j ⌉, define the products qj =
∏j
l=1 pl, and approximate
the input as
x ≈ s1q−11 + s2q−12 + · · ·+ smq−1m =
s1 +
s2+
. .
.
+ smpm
p3
p2
p1
with sj = ⌊qjx − pj⌊qj−1x⌋⌋ and q0 = 0. Applying a randomized rounding step to the last
message sm yields an unbiased random approximation of the original input. Given such a
representation of their input, a user then applies randomized response mechanisms to each
of the sj to either submit the true message with probability 1 − γj or a uniform value in
{0, . . . , pj} with probability γj = O(pj/n). Upon receiving the messages from all users, the
analyzer performs debiasing and summation operations to obtain the final result.
In our analysis of the protocol each message is allocated the same privacy budget and the
final privacy analysis follows from the standard composition properties of differential privacy
applied to the privacy analysis of the one-message protocol which relies on privacy amplifi-
cation by shuffling. The parameters pj and γj are chosen to optimize the error contributions
due to privacy and rounding as discussed in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Refining this analysis
using the advanced composition theorem leads to the result with O((log log n)2) MSE and
O(log logn) messages referenced in Table 1 (Corollary 4.1).
IKOS protocol. The IKOS protocol (Section 6) uses a constant number of messages to
achieve the same asymptotic error as optimal mechanisms in the curator model. The main
idea behind the protocol is to leverage the reduction from secure summation to multi-message
shuffling of Ishai et al. [12] in order to obtain a distributed implementation of a (discretized)
Laplace mechanism using constant variance noise. Getting this idea to work required us
to overcome a number of technical difficulties, including a significant strengthening of the
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reduction in [12] which in its original form only gives a summation protocol with constant
MSE by using a logarithmic number of messages as discussed in Section 5.
The reduction in [12] provides a protocol P where n users, each holding an integer xi ∈ Zq,
i ∈ [n], use m independent shufflers to securely compute ∑i xi. This is achieved by letting
each user generate m additive shares of their input, i.e. a tuple ~yi ∈ Zmq ofm uniform random
elements from Zq conditioned on
∑
j y
(j)
i = xi, and send the shares to a data collector usingm
independent shufflers. By adding the shares received from all the shufflers, the data collector
can exactly compute the sum of the inputs. The result of Ishai et al. is a security claim
stating that if ~x, ~x′ ∈ Znq are input tuples with the same sum,
∑
i xi =
∑
i x
′
i, then the views
VP(~x) and VP(~x′) of the data collector in the two executions are indistinguishable in the
sense that TV(VP(~x),VP(~x′)) ≤ 2−σ for some number of messages m = O(log(qn)+σ). One
of our main technical contributions is an improved analysis of this reduction showing that
the same security guarantees can be achieved with the much smaller number of messages
m = O(1 + log(q)+σ
log(n)
).
Equipped with this improved reduction to perform secure summation in Zq in the multi-
message shuffle model with low communication, we construct a simulation of the optimal
ε-DP real summation protocolM(~x) =∑i xi+Lap(1/ε) by discretizing the input to a large
enough abelian finite group Zq and distributing the noise addition step across the n users
involved in the protocol. This is achieved by leveraging the observation from [10] showing
that the discrete Laplace distribution over Z with distribution P[k] ∝ α−|k| (i.e. the two-sided
geometric distribution) is infinitely divisible, and therefore it is possible to obtain samples
from this distribution by summing n i.i.d. samples from some fixed distribution (in this case,
the one obtained by taking the difference between two Po´lya random variables). Since the
secure summation protocol only works in a finite group, the users of our real summation
protocol first discretize their inputs xi ∈ [0, 1] to integers with precision p = O(
√
n), then
add their share of the noise, and finally truncate the result modulo q = O(n3/2). These
parameter choices ensure that (i) the errors due to noise and discretization are of the same
order of magnitude, and (ii) with high probability, there is enough space in the group to
represent the noisy sum without overflows.
Putting the secure summation protocol together with the discretized distributed noise
addition technique yields a protocol for private summation in the multi-message shuffle
model. The privacy guarantees of this protocol follow from bounding its total variation
distance from the discretized summation protocol with truncated discrete Laplace noise in
the curator model (Lemma C.2). Thus, the protocol has MSE O(1) like the optimal protocol
in the curator model, and uses O(1) messages per user by virtue of our analysis of the
summation to shuffling reduction.
4 Recursive Protocol
The intuition behind the private single-message summation protocol in [1] is simple: the local
randomizer first represents the input x in a discrete domain of size p + 1, and then applies
randomized response with probability γ on the discretized (fixed-point) value. For example,
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Algorithm 1: Local Randomizer Rγ,p
Public Parameters: γ, p
Input: x¯ ∈ {0, . . . , p}
Output: y ∈ {0, . . . , p}
Sample b← Ber (γ)
if b = 0 then
Let y ← x¯
else
Sample y ← Unif({0, . . . , p})
return y
Algorithm 2: Analyzer Aγ,p,n
Public Parameters: γ and number of parties n
Input: Multiset {yi}i∈[n], with yi ∈ {0, . . . , p}
Output: z ∈ R
Let zˆ ←∑ni=1 yi
Let z ← DeBias(zˆ), where DeBias(w) =
(
w − nγ(p+1)
2
)
/ (1− γ)
return z
if x = 0.2342 and p = 10, the local randomizer submits 2 + Ber(0.342) with probability
1− γ, and a uniformly random value in {0, . . . , p} with probability γ. Here, the error of the
fixed-point encoding due to the choice of p needs to be balanced with the error due to the
randomized response procedure. On one hand, γ needs to grow with p, hence, for a fixed
choice of privacy parameters, the larger p is the less often the true value will be reported.
On the other hand, the error due to discretization decreases with p, as it corresponds to the
precision in the fixed-point encoding.
In this section we show how to do better if we are allowed more messages. As before,
assume that we choose the precision of our first message to be p1 = 10. Then, the fixed-point
encoding of x = 0.2342 is 2 and this has an error of 0.0342, as before. Instead of applying
a randomized rounding step as in the single-message case, we can just apply a randomized
response of the value 2, with domain {0, . . . , 10} and probability γ1 and recursively apply
the same idea to the residual value 0.0342. For example, if we choose p2 = 100, and we are
limited to just two messages, then the second message will be the randomized response of
34+Ber(0.2) with domain {0, . . . , 100}, and probability γ2. In summary, we recursively apply
the single-message procedure on the error of the fixed-point encoding of the current message,
and randomized rounding in the last message, as the base case. This corresponds to choosing
precisions p1, p2, . . . and probabilities γ1, γ2, . . . to, analogously to the single-message case,
achieve a good balance between privacy and accuracy.
The m-message recursive summation protocol is defined by Prec~γ,~p,n = (Rrec~γ,~p,Arec~γ,~p,n). The
local randomizer is shown in Algorithm 3. The algorithm takes a sequence of precisions
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Algorithm 3: Local Randomizer Rrec~p,~γ
Public Parameters: Number of shufflers m, vector of precisions ~p ∈ Nm, and vector
of randomized response probabilities ~γ ∈ [0, 1]m. Also, let
qj =
∏j
l=1 pl and q0 = 0.
Input: x ∈ [0, 1]
Output: ~y ∈
(∏m−1
j=1 {0, . . . , pj}
)
× {0, . . . , pm + 1}
for j ← 1 to m do
Let sj ← ⌊qjx− pj⌊qj−1x⌋⌋
Let r ← Ber (qmx− pm⌊qm−1x⌋ − sm)
Let sm ← sm + r
for j ← 1 to m− 1 do
Let yj ← Rγj ,pj(sj)
Let ym ←Rγm,pm+1(sm)
return ~y
p1, . . . , pm and probabilities γ1, . . . , γm. We also define qj =
∏j
l=1 pl for simplicity. The
algorithm consists of m executions of a discrete summation protocol (Algorithms 1 and 2),
where the jth message is the fixed-point encoding (with precision pj) of the error up to
message j due to fixed-point encoding in previous messages, and the last message includes
randomized rounding. This achieves the same goal than in the single-message protocol, i.e.
obtain an unbiased estimate of the sum. The respective analyzers are given in Algorithms 4
and 2 and only involve a standard debiasing step, and summation.
Let us first focus on the discrete summation subprotocol Pγ,p,n = (Rγ,p,Aγ,p,n). Theo-
rem 1 of [1] states that this protocol is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private in the shuffle model, so
long as ǫ ≤ 1 and γ ≥ max
{
14p log(2/δ)
(n−1)ǫ2 ,
27p
(n−1)ǫ
}
. The mean squared error on the result is
Oǫ,δ(p
3), which is optimal for summation in {0, . . . , p} up to constants. This bound is given
in (the proof of) Theorem 2 from [1] as follows.
Theorem 4.1 ([1]). Let ǫ ≤ 1 and γ = max{14p log(2/δ)
(n−1)ǫ2 ,
27p
(n−1)ǫ} < 1. Then
MSE(Pγ,p,n) ≤ n
(1− γ)2
(
γ(p2 − 1)
12
+
(p− 1)2γ(1− γ)
4
)
.
Neglecting log(1/δ) terms, this is Oδ(p
3/ǫ2).
To understand the privacy guarantees of the recursive algorithm first note that the privacy
budget must be split over the different shufflers. It satisfies any differential privacy guarantee
that is satisfied by the composition of m copies of Algorithm 1 run with parameters γj, pj
and n. The condition ǫ ≤ m could be relaxed by a constant factor at only a constant factor
cost to the given bounds, it follows from the assumption ǫ ≤ 1 made in the single-message
case to simplify the analysis. The following theorem, which we will prove next, states the
main result of this section: O(log log n) messages suffice to achieve MSE O((log log n)3).
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Algorithm 4: Analyzer Arec~γ,~p,n
Public Parameters: ~γ,~p and number of parties n
Input: Multiset {~yi}i∈[n], with ~yi ∈
(∏m−1
j=1 {0, . . . , pj}
)
× {0, . . . , pm + 1}
Output: z ∈ [0, 1]
for j ← 0 to m− 1 do
Let zj ← Aγj ,pj ,n(((yi)j)i∈[n])
Let zm ← Aγm,pm+1,n(((yi)m)i∈[n])
Let z ←∑mj=1 zj/pj
return z
Theorem 4.2. For ǫ ≤ m and log(1/δ) ≥ 2ǫ, take ǫj = ǫ/m, δj = δ/m, γj = 14(pj+Ij=m) log(2/δj )(n−1)ǫ2j
and pj = n
3j−m−1 . Then Prec~γ,~p,n is (ǫ, δ)-differentally private and
MSE(Prec~γ,~p,n) = Oδ
(
n3
−m
(
1 +
m3
ǫ2
))
.
In particular, for m = ⌊log3(log2(n))⌋ and pj = 23j we get
MSE(Prec~γ,~p,n) = Oδ
(
(log log n)3
ǫ2
)
.
The above theorem uses basic composition, using advanced composition gives the follow-
ing corollary which follows from much the same proof. The asymptotics in n are better by
a factor of log log n, however this comes at the cost of a log(1/δ) factor and so in practice
the basic composition analysis might be preferred depending on the concrete values of the
parameters involved.
Corollary 4.1. Letm = ⌊log3(log2(n))⌋, pj = 23j , by taking appropriate ǫj = Θ
(
ǫ
√
log(1/δ)
m
)
and appropriate δj we get
MSE(Prec~γ,~p,n) = Oδ
(
(log log n)2
ǫ2
)
. (2)
4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2
We start by proving the following lemma on the error that the protocol incurs, which gives
a bounds on the MSE of the real summation protocol in terms of bounds on the MSE of the
discrete summation subroutines we viewed as standalone summation protocols for inputs on
{0, . . . , pj}n.
Lemma 4.1. Let Bj ≤ MSE(Pγj ,pj+Ij=m,n), for j in [m]. Then,
MSE(Prec~γ,~p,n) ≤
n
4q2m
+
m∑
j=1
Bj
q2j
.
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Proof. Note in the local randomizer that
∑
j sj/qj is an unbiased estimate of xi with variance
equal to the variance of r divided by q2m which is at most 1/(4q
2
m). Summing this noise over
all local randomizers gives mean squared error n/(4q2m). The contribution of the call to the
non recursive local randomizer on sj is scaled by the corresponding 1/qj providing the sum
in the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. For γj =
14(pj+Ij=m) log(2/δj )
(n−1)ε2j
, so long as 14 log(2/δj) ≥ 27εj, Theorem
4.1 and basic composition imply that the recursive protocol is (
∑
j εj,
∑
j δj)-differentially
private (ǫ ≤ m implies ǫj ≤ 1). The condition 14 log(2/δj) ≥ 27ǫj follows immediately from
log(1/δ) ≥ 2ǫ. As ∑ δj = δ and ∑ ǫj = ǫ this protocol is as private as required.
To explain where the choices of pj and ǫj come from we provide the analysis to choose
them as a part of the accuracy proof. Neglecting log(1/δ) factors and using the accuracy
estimates of Theorem 4.1 combined with Lemma 4.1, we get:
MSE(Prec~γ,~p,n) = Oδ
(
n
q2m
+
m∑
j=1
pj
q2j−1ǫ
2
j
)
.
We will minimize this expression by optimizing the pj over the real numbers for simplicity,
then rounding to integers turns out not to affect the asymptotics. Differentiating with respect
to pl, for l ∈ [m], gives
− 2nq
2
l
q2l−1p
3
l q
2
m
+
1
q2l−1ǫ
2
l
.
Setting this equal to zero and re-arranging gives
p3l =
2nǫ2l q
2
l
q2m
.
Dividing this result for two consecutive values of l gives
p3l
p3l−1
=
ǫ2l p
2
l
ǫ2l−1
and thus
pl =
ǫ2l p
3
l−1
ǫ2l−1
. (3)
Finding an ~ǫ, for fixed ~p, that minimizes the above expression for the MSE gives
ǫ3l ∝
pl
q2l−1
and thus
ǫ3l
ǫ3l−1
=
pl
p3l−1
.
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Combining this with Equation 3 we get that ǫl = ǫl−1, and substituting into Equation 3 gives
pl = p
3
l−1. We thus take ǫl = ǫ/m as stated in the theorem and write pl as a
3l . Note that∑k−1
i=1 3
i = 3
k−3
2
. The MSE bound now becomes
Oδ
(
na3−3
m+1
+
a3m3
ǫ2
)
.
Choosing a to minimize this gives a =
(
(3m−1)nǫ2
m3
)3−m−1
≈ n3−m−1 giving a bound on the
MSE of
Oδ
(
n3
−m
(
1 +
m3
ǫ2
))
.
Remark 4.1. We note that if we allow the constant a in the proof to take any real value the
upper bound is still of order (log log n)3. So better parameter choices can’t get us all the way
to constant error with this analysis. Using advanced composition in place of basic still fails
to achieve a constant upper bound. We therefore believe this algorithm incurs super-constant
error for any privacy preserving choice of parameters.
In the next section we show a protocol that achieves constant error with a constant
number of messages m, for large enough n. However, it requires m > 3, while the protocol
presented in this section achieves MSE at most Oǫ,δ(n
1/9) and Oǫ,δ(n
1/27) with 2 and 3
messages, respectively. This is in contrast with the Ω(n1/3) lower bound for the single
message case proved in [1].
5 Constant Error from Secure Summation
Extending the ideas from single message summation has failed to achieve an error that
doesn’t grow with n. In this section we take an alternative approach that will. They key
idea is to leverage a secure summation protocol in the shuffle model due to Ishai et al. [12].
This protocol can be used to simulate (a discrete version of) the Laplace mechanism –
which provides O(1) MSE in the central model – in the shuffle model. We will first define
the secure summation functionality, and then provide our result in the form of a reduction
from private summation to secure summation that preserves the number of messages being
shuffled. Combining this reduction with the result from [12] we obtain a private summation
protocol in the shuffle model with MSE O(1) using O(logn) messages. In the next section
we provide an improved analysis of secure summation that yields a protocol using only O(1)
messages.
5.1 Secure Exact Summation
Let G be an Abelian group and P = (R,A) be a protocol in the shuffle model with input
and output space G. We say that P computes exact summation if for any ~x ∈ Gn we have
MP(~x) =
∑
i∈[n] xi.
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Such a protocol is deemed secure if the view of the aggregator on input ~x is indistin-
guishable from the view on another input ~x′ producing the same output. More formally, we
say that a randomized protocol P computing exact summation over G provides worst-case
statistical security with parameter σ if for any ~x, ~x′ ∈ Gn, such that ∑i∈[n] xi = ∑i∈[n] x′i,
we have TV(VP(~x),VP(~x′)) ≤ 2−σ, where TV denotes the total variation (i.e. statistical)
distance.
The following result from [12] provides an upper bound on the number of messages
required to compute exact summation securely in the shuffle model.
Lemma 5.1 ([12]). There exists an n-party protocol that computes summation over Zq
in the (single-shuffler) shuffle model with worst-case statistical security parameter σ using
O(log(qn) + σ) messages per party.
The protocol by Ishai et al. is very simple. For a given number of messages m it uses
the local randomizer Rm(x) = (Y(1), . . . ,Y(m)), where Y(j) are uniform random variables
in G conditioned on
∑
j∈[m] Y
(j) = x. We refer to the output of Rm(x) as a collection
of additive shares of the input x. By using this randomizer, each user i submits to the
shuffler the additive shares Rm(xi) = (Y(1)i , . . . ,Y(m)i ) and all the analyzer needs to do is
sum the messages after shuffling to recover the sum
∑
i∈[n] xi =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m] Y
(j)
i . The
original presentation in [12] assumes all nm messages are shuffled together – i.e. it is in the
single-shuffler model discussed in Section 2.4 – but as the results in Section 6 will show, the
protocol also works in the m-parallel shufflers model considered in this paper. We refer to
this as the IKOS secure exact summation protocol, which is σ-secure as stated in the lemma.
We reproduce their proof in Section B, so that we can keep track of the constants. There
we show that in fact it suffices to take
m =
5
2
log(q) + σ + log(n− 1)
+
1
4
log(log(q) + σ + log(n− 1)) +O(1) . (4)
5.2 Distributed Noise Addition
The challenge to simulate the Laplace mechanism assuming a secure summation protocol
in the shuffle model is to distribute the noise addition operation across n users. A simple
solution is to have a designated user add the noise required in the curator model. This
is however not a satisfying solution as it does not withstand collusions and/or dropouts.
To address this, Shi et al. [14] proposed a solution where each party adds enough noise to
provide ǫ-DP in the curator model with probability log(1/δ)/n, which results in an (ǫ, δ)-DP
protocol. However, one can do strictly better: the total noise can be reduced by a factor of
log(1/δ). To achieve this each party adds a discrete random variable such that the sum of
the contributions is exactly enough to provide ǫ-DP.
A discrete random variable with this property is provided in [10], where it is shown that
a discrete Laplace random variable can be expressed as the sum of n differences of two
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Po´lya random variables (the Po´lya distribution is a generalization of the negative binomial
distribution). Concretely, if Xi and Yi are independent Polya(1/n, α) random variables then
Z =
∑n
i=1(Xi−Yi) follows a discrete Laplace distribution DLap(α) on Z, i.e. P[Z = k] ∝ α|k|.
This allows to distribute the noise in the Laplace mechanism across n users and achieve ǫ-DP
on the result of the sum by tuning α appropriately.
This discrete noise distribution forms the basis of the randomizer of the protocol presented
in the next section. When designing the protocol we will need to take care of working in the
finite group Zq instead of Z, and thus analyze the potential effect on accuracy arising from
overflows in the unlikely event that the noise becomes too large.
5.3 Private Summation
In this section we prove a reduction in the shuffle model for converting a secure integer
summation protocol into a differentially private real summation protocol. We then combine
this lemma with Lemma 5.1 to derive an explicit protocol for differentially private real
summation. The privacy argument relies on leveraging the security properties of the IKOS
summation protocol to compare the outputs of our private summation protocol in the shuffle
model with a protocol in the central model where the noise is added to the sum of all the
inputs and then an execution of the IKOS protocol is simulated.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose for any q > 0 there exists an n-party secure exact summation protocol
over Zq in the shuffle model providing worst-case statistical security with parameter σ with
f(q, n, σ) messages per party. Then there exists an (ǫ, (1+ eǫ)2−σ−1)-DP protocol for private
real summation in the shuffle model with MSE Oǫ(1) and f(⌈2n3/2⌉, n, σ) messages per party.
Proof. Let Π = (RΠ,AΠ) be the secure exact summation protocol. We will exhibit the
resulting protocol P = (R,A), with R = RΠ ◦ R˜ and A = A˜ ◦ AΠ, where R˜ and A˜ are
defined as follows. P executes Π with q = ⌈2n3/2⌉, and thus R˜ : [0, 1] 7→ Z⌈2n3/2⌉. R˜(xi) is
the result of first computing a randomized fixed-point encoding of the input x with precision
p =
√
n, then adding noise Zi ∼ Polya(1/n, e−ǫ/p) − Polya(1/n, e−ǫ/p) in Z and taking the
result modulo q. A˜ decodes z by returning (z − q)/p if z > 3np
2
, and z/p otherwise. This
addresses potential over/under-flows of the sum in Zq.
To show that this protocol is private we will compare the view VP to another mechanism
MC (which can be considered to be computed in the curator model) which is ǫ-DP and such
that TV(VP(~x),MC(~x)) ≤ 2−σ for all ~x, from which the result follows by Lemma C.2.
MC(~x) is defined to be the result of the following procedure. First apply R˜ to each input
xi, then take the sum s =
∑n
i=1 R˜(xi) and output VΠ(s, 0, . . . , 0), the view of the aggregator
in the protocol Π with first input s and all other inputs 0.
Note that s =
∑n
i=1 fp(xi, p) + DLap(α) with α = e
−ǫ/p, where we define the random-
ized rounding operation fp(x, p) = ⌊xp⌋ + Ber(xp − ⌊xp⌋). The worst-case sensitivity of∑n
i=1 fp(xi, p) under the change of one xi is p. It follows that s is ǫ-DP and thus by the post
processing property so is MC .
It remains to show that TV(VP(~x),MC(~x)) ≤ 2−σ, which we will do by demonstrating
the existence of a coupling. First let the noise added to input xi by R˜ be the same in both
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Algorithm 5: Analyzer An,m,p,q
Public Parameters: Number of parties n, number of messages per party m,
precision p and order q > np of the additive group.
Input: Multiset {yi}i∈[nm], with yi ∈ Z
Output: z ∈ R
Let z ←∑nmi=1 yi mod q ⊲ Add all inputs mod q
if z > np+q
2
then z ← z − q ⊲ Correct for underflow
return z/p ⊲ Rescale and return estimate
mechanisms and note that this results in the inputs to the randomizers from Π used in P
and MC to have the same sum. It then follows immediately from the worst-case statistical
security assumption that the executions of the randomizers and shufflers in VP andMC can
be coupled to have identical outputs except with probability 2−σ, as required.
Next we show thatMP has MSE Oǫ(1). The mean squared error incurred by randomized
rounding is bounded by n/(4p2) by Lemma C.1. The discrete Laplace distribution DLap(α)
has mean zero and variance 2α/(1 − α)2, so rescaling by p gives a mean squared error
of 2α/p2(1 − α)2. Summing these two terms would give the exact mean squared error if
our arithmetic was in Z, however we are in Zq and so need to account for the possibility
of under/overflowing. The worst-case mean squared error is bounded by (q/p)2, and the
probability of under/overflow bounded by α
q−np
2 so the following expression is a bound on
the mean squared error:
2α
p2(1− α)2 +
n
4p2
+ (q/p)2α
q−np
2
≤ 2e
−ǫ/√n
n(1− e−ǫ/√n)2 +
1
4
+ 5n2e−
ǫn
2
≤ 2
ǫ2
+
1
4
+ 5n2e−
ǫn
2 = O(1/ǫ2) .
Note that the second and third terms can be made arbitrarily small at the expense of more
communication by increasing p and q.
The choice p =
√
n was made so that the error in the discretization was the same order
as the error due to the noise added, and this recovers the same order MSE as the curator
model. Taking p = ω(
√
n) results in the leading term of the total MSE still matching the
curator model at the cost of a small constant factor increase to communication.
Combining Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2 we can conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. There exists an (ǫ, δ)-DP protocol in the shuffle model for real summation
with MSE O(1/ǫ2) and O(log(n/δ)) messages per party, each of length O(logn) bits.
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Algorithm 6: Local Randomizer Rα,m,p,q
Public Parameters: Noise magnitude α, number of messages m, precision p and
order q > np of the additive group.
Input: x ∈ [0, 1]
Output: ~y ∈ [0..q − 1]m
Let x˜← ⌊xp⌋ + Ber(xp− ⌊xp⌋) ⊲ x˜ is the encoding of x with precision p
Let y ← x˜+ Polya(1/n, α)− Polya(1/n, α) ⊲ add noise to x˜
Sample ~y ← Unif([0..q − 1]m) conditioned on ∑i∈[m] yi = y
return ~y ⊲ Submit m additive shares of y
Such a protocol can be constructed from the proofs of these lemmas and is given explicitly
by taking the local randomiser Rα,m,p,q given in Algorithm 6, and the analyzer An,m,p,q given
in Algorithm 5, with parameters p =
√
n, q = ⌈2np⌉, α = e−ǫ/p and m as in Equation 4.
6 Communication Efficient Secure Summation
Next we provide a refined analysis of the statistical security provided by the IKOS secure
summation protocol. Our analysis works for the parallel shuffle model version of the protocol,
which is a weaker assumption than the single-shuffler protocol considered in the original
analysis (cf. Section 2.4).
Since the aggregator in the IKOS protocol is just summation of all messages, throughout
this section we identify a protocol with the corresponding view of the aggregator for simplic-
ity. Accordingly, we identify the m-parallel IKOS protocol over G with the randomized map
Vm,n : Gn → (Gn)m obtained as the view of the aggregator in an m-message protocol in the
shuffle model with randomizer Rm:
Vm,n(~x) =
(
S(1)(Y(1)1 , . . . ,Y(1)n ), . . . ,S(j)(Y(j)1 , . . . ,Y(j)n ), . . .
. . . ,S(m)(Y(m)1 , . . . ,Y(m)n )
)
,
where Rm(xi) = (Y(1)i , . . . ,Y(m)i ).
The first result we prove uses the following weaker security notion compared to the worst-
case definition from Section 5.1. We say that a randomized protocol V with domain Gn pro-
vides average-case statistical security with parameter σ if we have E~X,~X′[TV|~X,~X′(V(~X),V(~X′))] ≤
2−σ, where ~X and ~X′ are n-tuples of uniform random elements from G conditioned on∑
i∈[n] Xi =
∑
i∈[n] X
′
i, and TV|~X,~X′ denotes the total variation distance when the inputs
are fixed (i.e. over the randomness coming from the protocol).
Theorem 6.1 (Average-case security). The protocol Vm,n over Zq provides average-case
statistical security with parameter
σ =
(m− 1)(log2(n)− log2(e))− log2(q)
2
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provided that σ ≥ 1, m ≥ 3 and n ≥ 19.
While the above theorem only states average-case security, a simple randomization trick
recovers worst-case security at the cost of one extra message per party (see Section 6.2).
Moreover, such a message does not need to be shuffled. This corresponds to a small variation
on the parallel IKOS protocol where one of the messages contributed by each user is not sent
through a shuffler; i.e. it is possible to unequivocally associate one of the messages from the
input to each user.
We define the m-parallel IKOS protocol with randomized inputs over G as the random-
ized map V˜m,n : Gn → (Gn)m+1 obtained as follows. Let S(j) : Gn → Gn, j ∈ [m],
be m independent shufflers. For any ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Gn define the random variables
(Y
(1)
i , . . . ,Y
(m+1)
i ) = Rm+1(xi), i ∈ [n], obtained by sampling m+ 1 additive shares for each
input. Then, the IKOS protocol with randomized inputs returns, for j ∈ [m], the result
of independently shuffling the jth shares of all the users together, concatenated with the
m+ 1th unshuffled shares:
V˜m,n(~x) =
(
S(1)(Y(1)1 , . . . ,Y(1)n ), . . . ,S(j)(Y(j)1 , . . . ,Y(j)n ), . . .
. . . ,S(m)(Y(m)1 , . . . ,Y(m)n ), (Y(m+1)1 , . . . ,Y(m+1)n )
)
.
Corollary 6.1. The protocol V˜m,n provides worst-case statistical security with parameter σ
given by the same expression as in Theorem 6.1 as long as m ≥ 3 and n ≥ 19. Thus, for
fixed n, q and σ, it suffices, for worst-case security, to take the number of shuffled messages
to be
m =
⌈
2σ + log2(q)
log2(n)− log2(e)
+ 1
⌉
. (5)
Therefore m need not be taken to grow as n goes to infinity as in Lemma 5.1. In fact,
it turns out a larger n results in each person having to send fewer messages. This can be
intuitively understood as a greater number of people providing a greater amount of “cover”
to hide in the crowd.
Plugging this result into the private summation protocol from the previous section leads
to our main result, which removes the log(n) factor from the number of messages submitted
by each party.
Theorem 6.2. There exists an (ǫ, δ)-DP protocol in the shuffle model for real summation
with MSE O(1/ǫ2) and O(log(1/δ)) messages per party, each of length O(logn) bits.
6.1 Proof Outline
We now provide an outline of the proof of Theorem 6.1. The details can be found in the
Appendix. In this proof we will provide forward references to the required lemmas where we
use them.
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Proof of Theorem 6.1. Lemma A.3 in Section A.1 says that protocol V = Vm,n provides
statistical security with distance bounded by the following expression:
E~X,~X′ [TV|~X,~X′(V(~X),V(~X′))] ≤
√
qmn−1P[E]− 1 ,
where E is an event specified in Section A.1 that relates two independent executions of V
with the same (random) inputs. To bound the probability of event E, Section A.2 defines a
probability distribution over a certain class of multigraphs. Lemma A.4 then says that if G
is drawn from this distribution and C(G) is the number of connected components in G, then
P[E] ≤ q−mnE[qC(G)] .
This expectation is then bounded in Lemma A.5, which says that, if n ≥ 19, m ≥ 3 and
q ≤ 1
2
(
n
e
)m−1
,
E[qC(G)] ≤ q + q2
(n
e
)1−m
.
Note that the condition required on q here is implied by
(m− 1)(log2(n)− log2(e))− log2(q)
2
≥ 1
and thus follows from the condition in the theorem that σ ≥ 1.
Putting this together we get average case statistical security less than or equal to
√
q(e/n)m−1.
Thus we have average case statistical security 2−σ for
σ =
(m− 1)(log2(n)− log2(e))− log2(q)
2
.
6.2 Reduction to Random Inputs
Here we prove Corollary 6.1 from Theorem 6.1 by showing that a certain level of average-case
security with m messages implies the same level of worst-case security with m+1 messages.
In addition, we show that the additional message required to reduce worst-case security to
average-case security does not need to be sent through a shuffler. Note that the expression
for the required m in Corollary 6.1 is a simple rearrangement of the expression for σ, so the
following lemma is all that remains to be proven.
Lemma 6.1. If Vm,n provides average-case statistical security with parameter σ, then Vm+1,n
and V˜m,n provide worst-case statistical security with parameter σ.
Proof. Fix a pair of inputs ~x and ~x′ with the same sum. Since the output of Vm+1,n(~x) can
be simulated directly from the output of V˜m,n(~x) by applying a random permutation to the
last n elements, we have TV(Vm+1,n(~x),Vm+1,n(~x′)) ≤ TV(V˜m,n(~x), V˜m,n(~x′)), and therefore
it suffices to show that V˜m,n provides worst-case statistical security with parameter σ.
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The key observation that allows us to reduce the worst-case security of V˜m,n to the
average-case security of Vm,n(~x) is to observe that the addition of an extra share can be
interpreted as adding a random value to each user’s input, effectively making the inputs
uniformly random. To formalize this intuition we observe that Rm admits a recursive de-
composition as follows. Let U ∈ G be a uniformly random group element and x ∈ G. Then
we have R1(x) = x and, for m ≥ 1,
Rm+1(x) = (Rm(x− U),U) .
Expanding this identity into the definition of V˜ and writing ~U = (U1, . . . ,Un) for the uniform
random variables arising from applying the above expression forRm+1 to the input from each
user, we obtain
V˜m(~x) = (Vm(~x− ~U), ~U) .
Note that here ~x−~U is a uniform random vector in Gn. The result now follows from matching
the uniform randomness from ~U observed when executing the protocol with two inputs with
the same sum:
TV(V˜m+1(~x), V˜m+1(~x′)) = TV((Vm(~x− ~U), ~U), (Vm(~x′ − ~U′), ~U′))
= E~U[TV|~U(Vm(~x− ~U),Vm(~x′ − ~U))]
= E~X,~X′[TV|~X,~X′(Vm(~X),Vm(~X′))] ,
where ~X and ~X′ are tuples with n uniformly random group elements conditioned on
∑
i Xi =∑
i X
′
i.
7 Discussion
We have presented two protocols resulting from two different approaches to real summation
in the shuffle model of differential privacy. The first protocol achieves MSE as small as
O((log logn)2), and to do so requires each user to send O(log log n) messages of size O(logn)
each. The second protocol achieves constant error, and to do so only requires a constant
number of messages per user. The first protocol uses the blanketing idea from Balle et al. [1],
while the second protocol relies on a reduction from secure discrete summation to shuffling
by Ishai et al. [12]. In fact, the core of our contribution in the design of the second protocol
is in the improved analysis of such reduction, which is of independent interest from a secure
computation perspective. The fact that the ideas behind the two protocols are so different
has interesting implications worth discussing, as the two results complement each other in
interesting ways.
Breaking the O(n1/3) barrier. Previous works by Balle et al. [1] and Cheu et al. [4] show
that with a single message one could achieve MSE Θ(n1/3), and O(n1/2) messages where
enough to achieve error O(1). Our work reduces this gap in several ways: first, we showed
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that the IKOS protocol with the proof technique proposed by Ishai et al. in the original paper
leads to a protocol where O(logn) messages are enough to achieve constant error. Next, we
further improve on that by providing an alternative proof which resolves affirmatively the
question of whether a constant number of messages is enough to achieve constant error for
summation in the shuffle model. Moreover, our proof tracks constants, which allows us to
provide concrete bounds on the number of messages required to achieve constant error, for
given values of n, ǫ and δ. However, this result assumes that the number of messages per
user is at least 3, and thus does not address the question of whether 2 messages are enough
to break the lower bound by Balle et al. The recursive protocol, on the other hand, allows
to trade accuracy by number of messages, and resolves this question affirmatively: the two-
message variant of this protocol has MSE O(n1/9). Whether that upper bound is tight is an
open question.
Robustness against adversarial behaviour. An important difference between our two pro-
tocols is their ability to withstand adversarial users that might deviate from the prescribed
protocol execution to bias (or even completely spoil) the result. To protect from this kind
of manipulation attacks, protocols must have mechanisms to limit the influence of any par-
ticular user (or a possibly coordinated coalition of them) beyond what the function being
computed inherently allows. In particular, for the task of real summation, a particular user’s
influence is at least 1. Note that the maximum possible influence of a particular user in our
IKOS protocol from Section 6 is 2n, as a dishonest user could replace their actual input
(which should be encoded as an integer in {0, . . . , p} as prescribed by the protocol) by an
arbitrary value in Zq. We leave open the question of whether this protocol can be efficiently
“patched” to address this issue. Recent work by Cheu et al. [3] studies the issue of ma-
nipulation by coalitions of dishonest users in the context of the local model of differential
privacy. Their results show that non-interactive protocols in the local model are in a sense
manipulable. In particular, for the case of summation a dishonest user can skew the result
by Ω(1/ǫ). Intuitively, this is because in the local model (where each user gets privacy in-
dependently of the rest) large changes in the input distribution induce only a small change
in the distribution of messages observed by the analyzer. Hence, dishonest users inducing
small changes in the distribution of messages can induce large changes in the final estimate
produced by the analyzer. In contrast, for our recursive protocol from Section 4 the maxi-
mum skew a user can induce is 1+Oδ
(
(log logn)2
n2/3ǫ2
)
. To see this, note that messages sent by a
dishonest user, even if they are anonymized via the shuffer, still need to “typecheck”. Hence,
even a dishonest user must report m values y1, . . . , ym. These values must be in {0, . . . , pj}
and {0, . . . , pm+1}, with precisions p1, . . . , pm prescribed by the protocol. Similarly to what
happens in the local model, our analyzer debiases the result by scaling each contribution yj
by 1/(1−γj). As γj in our protocol is Oδ
(
1
n1−3
j−m−1
ǫ2j
)
≤ Oδ
(
m2
n2/3ǫ2
)
, the amount by which
each yj is scaled is 1 + Oδ
(
(log logn)2
n2/3ǫ2
)
. As even without privacy a single user can skew the
result by 1 this represents very little extra manipulability compared to the non-private case.
It is important to remark that dishonest users in the shuffle model can harm privacy by
not providing blanketing noise as expected. This is easily achieved by simply sending invalid
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messages. A straightforward defense is to increase the overall noise by a constant factor that
accounts for the maximum fraction of expected misbehaving users.
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A Proof of Secure Summation
In this section we give the lemmas required to complete the proof of Theorem 6.1 in Sec-
tion 6.1.
A.1 Reduction to a single input and shuffling step
To analyze the average-case statistical security of V we start by upper bounding the expected
total variation distance between the outputs of two executions with random inputs by a
function of single random input.
Lemma A.1. Let Vm,n and V ′m,n denote two independent executions of the m-parallel IKOS
protocol. Then we have:
E~X,~X′[TV|~X,~X′(Vm,n(~X),Vm,n(~X′))]
≤
√
qmn−1P[Vm,n(~X) = V ′m,n(~X)]− 1 .
Proof. We first remove the expectation over ~X′ by taking its randomness inside the total
variation distance (ie. switching from TV|~X,~X′ to TV|~X). Note that this is akin to a reverse
Jensen inequality, and therefore we will need to pay a factor of 2 to get the result via a
triangle inequality. The formal bound is obtained by taking ~X′′ to be an independent copy
of ~X′ and observing that
E~X,~X′[TV|~X,~X′(V(~X),V(~X′))]
≤E~X,~X′[TV|~X,~X′(V(~X),V(~X′′)) + TV|~X,~X′(V(~X′′),V(~X′))]
=E~X[TV|~X(V(~X),V(~X′′))] + E ~X′ [TV|~X′(V(~X′′),V(~X′))]
=2E~X[TV|~X(V(~X),V(~X′))] .
Next we observe that ~V = V(~X′) has uniform distribution over the tuples in Gmn that
add up to
∑
i Xi. We use this information to expand the total variation and write it as an
expectation over ~V as follows:
2TV|~X(V(~X),V(~X′)) = 2TV|~X(V(~X), ~V)
=
∑
~v∈Gmn
|P|~X[V(~X) = ~v]− P[~V = ~v]|
=
∑
~v∈Gmn:∑~v=∑ ~X
|P|~X[V(~X) = ~v]− q1−mn|
= qmn−1E~V[|P|~X,~V[V(~X) = ~V]− q1−mn|] .
The final task is to bound the remaining expectation. We start by defining the random
variable Z = Z(~X, ~V) := P|~X,~V[V(~X) = ~V]. Note that because both V(~X) and ~V follow the
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same uniform distribution over tuples in Gmn conditioned to having the same sum, we have
E~X,~V[Z] = P[V(~X) = ~V] = q1−mn .
Therefore, the expectation that we need to bound takes the simple form E[|Z − E[Z]|], and
can be bounded in terms of E[Z2] via Jensen’s inequality:
E[|Z− E[Z]|] ≤
√
V[Z] =
√
E[Z2]− E[Z]2 .
Now recall that if A,A′ ∈ A are i.i.d. random variables, then we have
P[A = A′] =
∑
a∈A
P[A = a]2 .
Using this identity we can write the expectation of Z2 over the randomness in ~V in terms of
the probability that two independent executions of V(~X) (conditioned on ~X) yield the same
result:
E~V[Z
2] = q1−mn
∑
~v∈Gmn:∑~v=∑ ~X
P|~X[V(~X) = ~v]2
= q1−mnP|~X[V(~X) = V ′(~X)] .
Putting the pieces together completes the proof:
E~X,~X′ [TV|~X,~X′(V(~X),V(~X′))]
≤2E~X[TV|~X(V(~X),V(~X′))]
≤qmn−1E~X,~V[|P|~X,~V[V(~X) = ~V]− q1−mn|]
≤
√
qmn−1P[V(~X) = V ′(~X)]− 1 .
To further simplify the bound in previous lemma we can write the probability P[Vm,n(~X) =
V ′m,n(~X)] in terms of a single permutation step. For that purpose we introduce the notation
Vm,n = Sm,n ◦ ~Rm,n, where:
• ~Rm,n : Gn → Gnm is the randomized map that given ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) generates the
shares (Y
(1)
i , . . . ,Y
(m)
i ) = R(xi) and arranges them in order first by share id and then
by user:
~Rm,n(~x) = (Y(1)1 , . . . ,Y(1)n , . . . ,Y(m)1 , . . . ,Y(m)n ) .
• Sm,n : Gnm → Gnm is a random permutation of its inputs obtained by applying m
independent shufflers S(j), j ∈ [m], to the inputs in blocks of n:
Sm,n(y(1)1 , . . . , y(1)n , . . . , y(m)1 , . . . , y(m)n )
=(S(1)(y(1)1 , . . . , y(1)n ) · · · S(m)(y(m)1 , . . . , y(m)n ))
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It is important to note that Sm,n produces random permutations of [mn] which are uniformly
distributed in the subgroup of all permutations which arise as the parallel composition of
m uniform permutations on [n]. Equipped with these observations, it is straightforward to
verify the following identity.
Lemma A.2. Let ~Rm,n and ~R′m,n denote two independent executions of the additive sharing
step in Vm,n(~X) = Sm,n ◦ ~Rm,n. Then we have
P[Vm,n(~X) = V ′m,n(~X)] = P[ ~Rm,n(~X) = Sm,n ◦ ~R′m,n(~X)] .
Proof. We drop all subscripts for convenience. The result follows directly from the fact that
S is uniform over a subgroup of permutations, which implies that the inverse of S and the
composition of two independent copies of S both follow the same distribution as S. Thus,
we can write:
P[V(~X) = V ′(~X)] = P[S ◦ ~R(~X) = S ′ ◦ ~R′(~X)]
= P[ ~R(~X) = S−1 ◦ S ′ ◦ ~R′(~X)]
= P[ ~R(~X) = S ◦ ~R′(~X)] .
Putting these two lemmas together yields the following bound.
Lemma A.3. Let Vm,n and V ′m,n denote two independent executions of the m-parallel IKOS
protocol. Then we have:
E~X,~X′[TV|~X,~X′(Vm,n(~X),Vm,n(~X′))]
≤
√
qmn−1P[ ~Rm,n(~X) = Sm,n ◦ ~R′m,n(~X)]− 1 .
A.2 Reduction to a problem on random graphs
Definition A.1. A random n-vertex 2m-regular multigraph G is from the unconditioned
permutation model, denoted R∗(n, 2m), if it can be constructed as follows. Start with n
vertices and no edges. Take a set of m uniformly random and independent permutations of
the vertices, denoted {πi}mi=1. For each vertex v and each index i ∈ [m], add an edge between
v and πi(v). We say that G is generated by {πi}mi=1.
Note that G may have self-loops. Let C(G) be number of connected components of a
graph G.
Lemma A.4. Let G be drawn from R∗(n, 2m), then
P[ ~R(~X) = S ◦ ~R′(~X)] ≤ E[qC(G)−mn]
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Proof. Note that, by the tower law,
P[ ~R(~X) = S ◦ ~R′(~X)] = E[P[ ~R(~X) = S ◦ ~R′(~X)|S]].
Let GS be the unconditioned permutation model graph, with vertex set [n], generated by
the m permutations used in S. Note that, it suffices to show that
P[ ~R(~X) = S ◦ ~R′(~X)|S] = qC(GS)−mn.
For notational convenience, we will define a deterministic reordering of ~R(~X) and S◦ ~R′(~X)
as follows. Consider the permutation P : [mn]→ [mn]
P (j) =
⌊
j − 1
m
⌋
+ n(j − 1 mod m) + 1.
Define U,U′ ∈ Gmn by Uj = ~R(~X)P (j) and U′j = P ◦S◦ ~R′(~X)P (j). Note that P is such that
the shares from each input are grouped together (in order) in U. Consequently, U′ groups
together collections of m shares, one from the output of each shuffler. Thus it suffices to
show that
P[U = U′|S] = qC(GS)−mn.
For j ∈ [mn], let Aj be the event that Uj = U′j . Now define pj := P[Aj |A1, ..., Aj−1,S],
thus
P[U = U′|S] =
mn∏
j=1
pj .
First we consider values of j that are not divisible by m, i.e. they are not the final
share in a group of m. For such a j, we claim pj = q
−1. To see this, condition on ~X and
~R′, in addition to A1, ..., Aj−1. Note that Uj and Uj+1 only depend upon anything we’ve
conditioned on via their sum. Therefore Uj is still uniformly distributed and has probability
q−1 of being equal to U′j .
For an index i ∈ [mn] we define the vertex corresponding to i to be the vertex ⌈i/m⌉,
and we define Ci to be the set of vertices in the same connected component as this vertex
in GS . For the remaining j’s, we distinguish the case where the corresponding vertex is the
highest index in Cj and the case where it isn’t.
In the first case, ∑
i s.t. Ci=Cj
U
′
i =
∑
i s.t. Ci=Cj
~R′(~X)P (i)
as the sums have the same summands in a different order. Further,∑
i s.t. Ci=Cj
~R′(~X)P (i) =
∑
i s.t. Ci=Cj
Ui
as they both represent sharings of the same input values and∑
i s.t. Ci=Cj
i 6=j
U
′
i =
∑
i s.t. Ci=Cj
i 6=j
Ui
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as we are conditioning on A1, ..., Aj−1. Putting these together we can conclude that pj = 1.
For the second case, we will find that pj = q
−1. We will show this by showing that if we
condition on the value of Uj then U
′
j is still uniformly distributed. That is to say that the
number of possible outcomes fitting those conditions with each value of Uj is independent
of that value. To show that these sets of outcomes have the same size we will partition the
possible outcomes into sets of size q, with U′j taking each value in G exactly once in each
set. This will be possible because the structure of GS allows us to change the value of U′j
and other values to preserve what is being conditioned on in an algebraically principled way.
If G = Zq, for some prime q, i.e. the set of possible outcomes forms a vector space, this
can be thought of as follows. The space of possible outcomes consitent with the conditions
is a subspace of the space of all outcomes. Thus showing that this subspace contains two
possible values for U′j suffices by the nice algebraic properties of vector spaces. That there
is more than one possible value of U′j is a consequence of GS “connecting the jth share to
later shares”. The following paragraphs make this formal in the more general setting of any
abelian group G.
Consider the set T of choices of (U ·U′) ∈ G2mn that are consistent with A1, ..., Aj−1 (and
a value of ~X). We consider the group action of G2mn on itself by addition. We will show that,
there exists a homomorphism G→ G2mn mapping g to ug with the following property. The
action of ug on G
2mn fixes T and Uj and adds g to U′j . Therefore, the equivalence relation,
of being equal upto adding ug for some g, partitions T into subsets of size q each containing
one value for which Aj holds. It follows, from the fact that each entry in T is equally likely,
that pj = q
−1.
To find such a homomorphism, note that there is a path in GS from the vertex corre-
sponding to the jth share to a higher index vertex. This is equivalent to saying that there is a
sequence (a1, b1, a2, b2, ..., al, bl, al+1) with the following properties. The ai and bi are elements
of [mn] and should be interpreted as indexes of Gmn. For all i ∈ [l], π(bi) = ai and bi and
ai+1 correspond to the same vertex. We have a1 = j, bl > j, ai 6= ai′ for any i 6= i′, and bi < j
for all i < l. Let ug be the element of G
2mn with a g in entries a2, ..., al+1, b1+mn, ..., bl+mn
and the identity everywhere else.
Adding ug doesn’t change the truth of A1, ..., Aj−1 because Uai and U
′
ai
= ~R′(~X)bi are
always incremented together, with the exception of when i = 1 or l+1 which is fine because
then ai ≥ j. In the case of i = 1 this adds g to U′j without changing Uj . The consistency of
the implied values of ~X is maintained because Uai and
~R′(~X)P (bi−1) are always incremented
together and affect the ~X implied by U the same as that implied by ~R′(~X). Thus, this ug has
the properties we claimed and pj = q
−1.
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Tying this together we have that
P[U = U′] = E[P[U = U′|S]]
= E[
mn∏
j=1
pj]
= E[qC(GS)−mn]
= E[qC(G)−mn] .
A.3 Understanding the number of connected components of G
Lemma A.5. Let n ≥ 19, m ≥ 3 and q ≤ 1
2
(
n
e
)m−1
. Let G be drawn from R∗(n, 2m), then
P(C(G) = c) ≤ 1.5
c−1
c!
( e
n
)(m−1)(c−1)
.
Therefore,
E[qC(G)] ≤ q + q2
(n
e
)1−m
.
Proof. Let p(n, c) = P[C(Gn) = c], we will show that the bound in the theorem holds by
induction on c. For c = 1 the bound is trivial as the right hand side equals 1. For c > 1,
p(n, c) =
1
c
∑
S⊂[n]
P[No edge from S to [n]− S]p(|S|, 1)p(n− |S|, c− 1)
=
1
c
n−c+1∑
s=1
(
n
s
)(
n
s
)−m
p(s, 1)p(n− s, c− 1).
We now bound this expression, using the induction hypothesis, to find that
p(n, c) ≤ 1
c
n−c+1∑
s=1
(
n
s
)1−m
1.5c−2
(c− 1)!
(
e
n− s
)(m−1)(c−2)
(6)
=
1.5c−1
c!
( e
n
)(m−1)(c−1) 2e1−m
3
n−c+1∑
s=1
(
(n− s)!s!nc−1
n!(n− s)c−2
)m−1
. (7)
To complete the proof it suffices to show that this sum on the right is at most 1.5em−1. Call
the sth summand from this sum as. We separate the summands into three cases, depending
32
on whether s is greater than n/10 and/or less than 3n/4. Firsty, if s ≤ n/10, then
as
as−1
=
(
s
n− s+ 1
(
n− s+ 1
n− s
)c−2)m−1
≤
(
s
n− se
c−2
n−s
)m−1
≤
(
e
10
9
9
)2
≤ 1
8
.
Thus we can bound the early summands with a geometric series as follows.
⌊n/10⌋∑
s=1
as ≤
⌊(n−c)/10⌋∑
s=1
a1
8s−1
≤
∞∑
s=1
a1
8s−1
≤ 8a1
7
=
8
7
(
n
n− 1
)(c−2)(m−1)
≤ 8
7
e
(c−1)(m−1)
n ≤ 8
7
e(m−1)
We now similarly consider the terms with s ≥ 3n/4. For these values of s,
as+1
as
=
(
s+ 1
n− s
(
n− s
n− s− 1
)c−2)m−1
≥
(
s
n− s
)m−2
≥ 9
If c > n/4 then there are no summands for s ≥ 3n/4. Otherwise we can bound the late
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summands with a geometric series as follows.
n−c+1∑
s=⌈3n/4⌉
as ≤
n−c+1∑
s=⌈3n/4⌉
an−c+1
9n−c+1−s
≤
n−c+1∑
s=−∞
an−c+1
9n−c+1−s
=
9an−c+1
8
=
9
8
(
(c− 1)!nc−1(n− c+ 1)!
n!(c− 1)c−2
)m−1
.
Applying Sterling’s bound,
√
2πnn+
1
2 e−n ≤ n! ≤ enn+ 12 e−n, to the factorials in the above
expression bounds it above by,
9
8
(
e2√
2π
(c− 1)1.5
(
1− c− 1
n
)n−c+1.5)m−1
.
As n ≥ 19 and c ≤ n/4, this is maximised for c = 3, and as we also have m ≥ 3 this results
in the bound
9
8
(
e2√
2π
2
√
2(1− 2
n
)n−1.5
)m−1
≤ (1.27)m−1 .
Finally we consider the case of n/10 < s < 3n/4. Let α = s/n. Substituting this into as
gives (
((1− α)n)!(αn)!
(n− 1)!(1− α)c−2
)m−1
.
Applying Sterling’s bound again bounds this expression by(
e2√
2π
√
n(1− α)2.5−c+(1−α)nααn+ 12
)m−1
≤
(
e2
√
n√
2π
ααn
)m−1
.
Where the inequality holds because (1− α) ≤ 1 and, for any summand that appears in the
sum, 2.5 − c + (1 − α)n > 0. The final expression is maximised for α = 3/4 and there are
fewer than 3n/5 summands with n/10 < s < 3n/4. Therefore the sum of all of these terms
can be bounded by,
3n
5
(
e2
√
n√
2π
(
3
4
) 3n
4
)m−1
≤
(
en
(
3
4
) 3n
4
)m−1
≤ 1.
Where we have used that m ≥ 3 and n ≥ 19. Adding these up the sum as a whole is bounded
by
8
7
em−1 + 1 + (1.27)m−1 < 1.5em−1.
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To conclude the proof we consider the expectation. Below we apply the definition of expec-
tation with the bound on the probability above.
E[qC(G)] ≤
n∑
c=1
qc
1.5c−1
c!
( e
n
)(m−1)(c−1)
Notice that every term after the second is at most qe
m−1
2nm−1
times the previous term, thus
E[qC(G)] ≤ q + 3q
2
4
(n
e
)1−m ∞∑
i=0
(
qem−1
2nm−1
)i
Then using that q ≤ 1
2
(
n
e
)m−1
we bound the sum by 4/3 to find
E[qC(G)] ≤ q + q2
(n
e
)1−m
.
B The Original IKOS Proof
In this section we provide a proof of Lemma 5.1, all the ideas for the proof are provided in [12]
but we reproduce the proof here keeping track of constants to facilitate setting parameters
of the protocol. The following definition and lemma from [11] are fundamental to why this
protocol is secure.
Let H be a family of functions mapping {0, 1}n to {0, 1}l . We say H is universal or a
universal family of hash functions if, for h selected uniformly at random from H , for every
x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, x 6= y,
P[h(x) = h(y)] = 2−l.
Lemma B.1 (Leftover Hash Lemma (special case)). Let D ⊂ {0, 1}n, s > 0, |D| ≥ 2l+2s
and let H be a universal family of hash functions mapping n bits to l bits. Let h, d and U
be chosen independently uniformly at random from H, D and {0, 1}l respectively. Then
TV ((h, h(d)), (h, U)) ≤ 2−s
To begin with we consider the case of securely adding two uniformly random inputs
X, Y ∈ Zq. Recall that Π is the protocol of the statement of the lemma, and let V (x, y) be
shorthand for MRΠ((x, y)) = S ◦RΠ((x, y)), i.e. the view of the analyzer in an execution of
protocol Π with inputs x, y. We write V for V (X, Y ) and V (x) for V (x, Y ). Finally let U
be an independent uniformly random element of Zq.
Lemma B.2. Suppose log
(
2m
m
) ≥ ⌈log(q)⌉ + 2s. Then, TV((V,X), (V, U)) ≤ 2−s.
35
Proof. For a ∈ Z2mq and π ∈
(
[2m]
m
)
let ha(π) =
∑
i∈π ai. (ha)a∈Z2mq are a universal family
of hash functions from
(
[2m]
m
)
to Zq. Let d be an independent uniformly random element
of
(
[2m]
m
)
. Note that (V, hV (d)) has the same distribution as (V,X), which follows from the
intuition that V corresponds to 2m random numbers shuffled together, and x can be obtained
by adding up m of them, and letting y be the sum of the rest.
The result now follows immediately from the fact that the Leftover Hash Lemma implies
that TV((V, hv(d)), (V, U)) ≤ 2−s.
Now we can use this to solve the case of two arbitrary inputs.
Lemma B.3. If x, y, x′, y′ ∈ Zq satisfy x+ y = x′ + y′, then we have
TV(V (x, y), V (x′, y′)) ≤ 2q2TV((V,X), (V, U)).
Proof. Markov’s inequality provides that
TV(V (x), V ) ≤ qTV((V,X), (V, U)) ∀x ∈ Zq
and thus by the triangle inequality
TV(V (x), V (x′)) ≤ 2qTV((V,X), (V, U)).
Note that
TV(V (x), V (x′)) =
∑
t∈Zq
TV(V (x)|Y = t− x, V (x′)|Y = t− x′)/q
=
1
q
∑
y∈Zq
TV(V (x, y), V (x′, y + x− x′))
and so for every x, y, x′ ∈ Zq and y′ = y + x− x′ we have
TV(V (x, y), V (x′, y′)) ≤ qTV(V (x), V (x′)).
Combining the last two inequalities gives the result.
Combining these two lemmas gives that, for x, y, x′, y′ ∈ Zq such that x+ y = x′ + y′,
TV(V (x, y), V (x′, y′)) ≤ 2q22−
log(2mm )−⌈log(q)⌉
2
≤ 2−m2 +1+ 5⌈log(q)⌉2 (8)
From which the following lemma is immediate
Lemma B.4. If m ≥ 2 + 5⌈log(q)⌉+ 2σ and x, y, x′, y′ ∈ Zq such that x+ y = x′ + y′ then
TV(V (x, y), V (x′, y′)) ≤ 2−σ
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We will now generalize to the case of n-party summation.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Let ~x, ~x′ ∈ Znq be two distinct possible inputs to the protocol, we say
that they are related by a basic step if they have the same sum and only differ in two entries.
It is evident that any two distinct inputs with the same sum are related by at most n − 1
basic steps. We will show that if m is taken to be 2 + 5⌈log(q)⌉+ ⌈2σ + 2 log(n− 1)⌉ and ~x
and ~x′ are related by a basic step then
TV(V (~x), V (~x′)) ≤ 2
−σ
n− 1 (9)
from which the lemma follows by the triangle inequality for statistical distance.
Let ~x and ~x′ be related by a basic step and suppose w.l.o.g. that ~x and ~x′ differ in the
first two co-ordinates. Taking m = 2 + 5⌈log(q)⌉ + ⌈2σ + 2 log(n − 1)⌉, by lemma B.4, we
can couple the values sent by the first two parties on input ~x with the values they send on
input ~x′ so that they match with probability 1− 2−σ
n−1 . Independently of that we can couple
the inputs of the other n− 2 parties so that they always match as they each have the same
input in both cases. This gives a coupling exhibiting that equation 9 holds.
Remark B.1. It may seem counter intuitive to require more messages the more parties
there are (for fixed q). The addition of the log(n − 1) term to m is necessary for the proof
of Lemma 5.1. The is because we are trying to stop the adversary from learning a greater
variety of things when we have more parties. However it may be the case that Theorem 4.1
could follow from a weaker guarantee than provided by Lemma 5.1 and such a property might
be true without the presence of this term.
It is an open problem to prove a lower bound greater than two on the number of messages
required to get O(1) error on real summation. A proof that one message is not enough is
given in [1].
B.1 Improving the constants
The constants implied by this proof can be improved by using a sharper bound for
(
2m
m
)
in
inequality 8. Using the bound
(
2m
m
) ≥ 4m√
π(m+1/2)
gives that taking m to be the ceiling of the
root of
m = 1 + σ +
5⌈log(q)⌉
2
+
1
4
log(π(m+
1
2
))
suffices in the statement of Lemma B.4. The resulting value of m is
5
2
log(q) + σ +
1
4
log(log(q) + σ) +O(1) .
Adding log(n − 1) to the root before taking the ceiling gives the following value of m for
which Lemma 5.1 holds
m =
5
2
log(q) + σ + log(n− 1) + 1
4
log(log(q) + σ + log(n− 1)) +O(1) .
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C Technical Lemmas
Randomized rounding. Our protocols use a fixed point encoding of a real number x
with integer precision p > 0 and randomized rounding, which we define as fp(x, p) = ⌊xp⌋+
Ber(xp− ⌊xp⌋). We note this rounding is unbiased in the sense that E[fp(x, p)]/p = x. The
following lemma provides a simple bound on the MSE of this operation.
Lemma C.1. For any ~x ∈ Rn, MSE(∑ni=1 fp(xi, p)/p,∑ni=1 xi) ≤ n/(4p2).
Proof. Let ∆i be fp(xi, p)/p− xi, and note that |∆i| ≤ 1/p and E(∆i) = 0. It follows that
MSE
(
n∑
i=1
fp(xi, p)/p,
n∑
i=1
xi
)
= E


(
n∑
i=1
∆i
)2 =
n∑
i=1
E[∆2i ] +
∑
1≤i<j≤n
(E[∆i∆j ]) =
n∑
i=1
E[∆2i ] ≤ n/(4p2).
Differential privacy from total variation distance. The following lemma (also stated
byWang et al. [15], Proposition 3) provides a convenient method to obtain differential privacy
guarantees by comparing the output distributions two protocols in terms of total variation
distance. Recall that the total variation distance between two random variables X and Y
can be defined as TV(X,Y) = 1
2
supE |P[X ∈ E]− P[Y ∈ E]|.
Lemma C.2. LetM : Xn → O andM′ : Xn → O be protocols such that TV(M(~x),M′(~x)) ≤
µ/2 for all inputs ~x ∈ Xn. If M is (ǫ, δ)-DP, then M′ is (ǫ, δ + (1 + eǫ)µ)-DP.
Proof. For any neighboring inputs ~x, ~x′ ∈ Xn and E ⊆ O we haveP[M(~x) ∈ E] ≤ eǫP[M(~x′) ∈
E] + δ and |P[M′(~x) ∈ E]− P[M(~x) ∈ E]| ≤ µ. It follows that P[M′(~x) ∈ E] ≤ P[M(~x) ∈
E] + µ ≤ eǫP[M(~x′) ∈ E] + δ + µ ≤ eǫ(P[M′(~x′) ∈ E] + µ) + δ + µ.
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